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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN COAL CO., 
EMERY MINING CORP., 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff/appellant, 
Case No. 19134 
vs. 
TERRY W. SANDSTRIM, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant/respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a writ of review from an order of the Industrial 
Commission. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The defendant Second Injury Fund concurs in the 
statement of the disposition by the Industrial Commission 
contained in the briefs of the plaintiffs and the defendant 
Industrial Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant Second Injury Fund respectfully 
requests that this court affirm the order of the Industrial 
Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Second Injury Fund concurs in the 
statement of facts contained in the briefs of the plaintiffs 
and the defendant Industrial Commission. This defendant 
notes additionally that it has paid to the defendant Sandstrom 
the permanent partial disability benefits for which the 
Industrial Commission held it liable. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal is whether the State Insurance 
Fund is entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury 
Fund for medical expenses and temporary disability benefits 
paid by the State Insurance Fund to the applicant during his 
initial period of temporary disability. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY 
APPLIED THE RECENTLY AMENDED PROVISIONS 
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-69 TO HOLD 
THE PLAINTIFFS LIABLE FOR COMPENSATION 
AND MEDICAL EXPENSES PAYABLE TO THE 
APPLICANT UP TO THE DATE OF HIS STABAL-
I ZATION 
The Industrial Commission has ruled that since the 
applicant's cause of action arose after the effective date of 
recent amendments of Utah Code Anno .. §35-1-69, payment of his 
temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses up 
to date of his stablization is the exclusive responsibility of 
the employer and its carrier. The Commission concluded that 
the Second Injury Fund is not liable for a portion of 
payments as it might have been before the statute was amended. 
The plantiffs contend the amendment did not change the rights 
of an employer to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund. 
At issue is the correct construction of the following paragraph 
added to §35-1-69 as part of the several amendments by the 
Legislature in 1981: (A copy of the entire provision is 
included as Appendix "A"). 
Where the payment of temporary total 
disability benefits, medical expenses, or 
other related items are required as a 
result of the industrial injury subject 
to this section, the employer or its 
insurance carrier shall be responsible 
for all such temporary benefits, medical 
care, or other related items up to the 
end of the period of temporary total 
disability resulting from the industrial 
injury. Any allocation of disability 
benefits, medical care, or other related 
items following such period shall be made 
between the employer or its insurer 
and the second injury fund as provided 
for herein, and any payments made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier in 
excess of its proportionate share shall 
be recoverable at the time of the 
award for combined disabilities if 
any is made hereunder. 
As noted previously, the plaintiff State Insurance 
Fund and the defendant Second Injury Fund stipulated before 
the Commission that the applicant had a 20% permanent partial 
disability of the back, 10% of which was caused by an industrial 
injury of November 23, 1981 and 10% of which was due to pre-
existing conditions. (R.195,212). Benefits for his permanent 
partial disability have been paid. The applicant incurred 
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medical expenses and was totally disabled for a period of time 
after the accident. Though the record does not reflect the 
period of his temporary total disability, the State Insurance 
Fund paid all amounts owing during this period and submitted to 
the Industrial Commission the question whether the Second Injury 
Fund should reimburse it for 50% of these expenses. (R.194,197). 
The Industrial Commission interpreted the amended 
portion of Section 69 cited above to mean that during a period 
of temporary total disability which follows an industrial 
accident that has aggravated a pre-existing condition, the 
employer is liable for the full amount of temporary total disability 
and medical expenses up to the end of that period,even if the 
applicant's permanent partial disability is in part attributable 
to pre-existing conditions. The Commission ruled that after 
this period ends, his benefits are subject to appor-
tionment between those parties and entered its order based 
upon this construction of the statute. (R.213,216). 
The question raised by the plaintiffs about the proper 
application of the amended provision of Utah Code Anno. §35-1-69 
is one of first impression. This Court should affirm the order 
of the Industrial Commission because its construction of the 
statute is clearly correct in view of the obvious meaning of 
the language used and the purpose of the Legislature in 
emending the statute. 
The plaintiffs correctly note in their brief that 
prior to enactment of the 1981 amendments, this Court construed 
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Section 69 of the Workers Compensation Act to mean that when-
ever a worker sustained a permanent disability as a result of 
an industrial accident that was substantially greater because 
it combined with a pre-existing disability, the Second Injury 
Fund was liable for a proportionate share of temporary total 
disability compensation and medical expenses as well as 
permanent disability benefits. This construction was first 
announced in the case of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. 
Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) and continued to be applied 
in later cases, i.e. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
610 P.2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
The plaintiffs incorrectly assert, however, that the 
cases of Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 430 (Utah 1982) 
and U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 657 
P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) are cases arising under the amended statutes 
which demonstrate that this Court construes the amendment to 
have made no change in the law. Though these cases were 
decided after the 1981 amendments were enacted, they arose out 
of industrial accidents which occurred before the amendments; the 
Paoli accident in 1979, Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, supra, 
656 P.2d at 420; and the most recent of Anderton's accidents 
in the U.S. Fid. & Guar. case was in July, 1975, U.S. Fed. 
Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, supra, 657 P.2d at 
764. In neither case did the Court apply or construe the 
amendment whose meaning is disputed in this case. 
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This court has held that its fundamental responsibility 
when interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of 
the Legislature, Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966). The first step in statutory 
construction is to examine the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the language employed to determine whether the intention 
of the Legislature is apparant, Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 
26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971}; Spangenberg v. 
Cheney School Dist., No. 30, 97 Wash. 2d 118, 641 P.2d 163 
( 198 3) . 
'lhe defendant Second Injury Fund contends that in 
this instance the intention of the Legislature is apparant 
from the clear meaning of the language used. With reference 
to medical expenses and temporary disability benefits the 
statute provides that, 
. the employer or its insurance 
carrier shall be responsible for all 
such temporary benefits, medical care, 
or other related items up to the end 
of the period of temporary total 
disability resulting from the injury. 
With reference to obligations arising after the initial period, 
it provides that 
Any allocation of disability benefits, 
medical care, or other related items 
following such period shall be made 
between the employer or its insurer 
and the second injury fund provided for 
herein ..• 
The plaintiff state Insurance Fund argues that since the 
Legislature provided that employers would be "responsible" for 
-6- Erz 
temporary benefits, it did not mean to make thl'm "liaule" for 
temporary benefits. It contends that even though the statute 
refers to allocations of benefits "following'' the initial 
period of temporary disability, the Legislature really intended 
to allocate benefits which arise during the initial period, 
exactly as it had been done before the amendment, without 
substantive change in the relative liabilities of employers 
and the Second Injury Fund. 
The word "responsible" is defined at p.1476 in Black's 
Law Dictionary, (Revised 4th Ed., 1968) as follows: 
"Liable, legally accountable, or 
answerable." 
In accordance is Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
(1966), p.1935 which lists "liable" as a synonym of "responsible". 
The State Insurance Fund advocates a construction of the 
statute which is inconsistent with it's plain meaning. Giving 
the words used their ordinary effect, it is apparant that the 
Legislature intended to distinguish between temporary benefits 
accruing before the initial period of temporary disability 
ends and other benefits which may accrue later. The first 
category of benefits is one for which the employer and its 
carrier are soley liable and the second category is one which 
is to be apportioned with the Second Injury Fund if the other 
requirements of Section 69 are satisfied. 
Even if this statute is regarded as ambiguous, the 
rules of construction which must then be applied resolve the 
ambiguity in the defendant's favor. One presumption which 
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arises in construing an amendment to a statute is that the 
Legislature was aware of the construction given to a statute 
uy the Supreme Court before it was amended, Greenhalgh v. 
l'aj'SOn City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); Lekan v. P&L Fire 
Protection Co., 609 P.2d 1289 (Okl. 1980); Woodson v. State, 
95 Wash. 2d 257, 623 P.2d 683 (1980). A second presumption 
is that when a statute is amended, the Legislature is presumed 
to intend a change in the law by Lincoln County 
v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632 
P.2d 678 (1981); State v. Turpin, 94 Wash. 2d 820, 620 P.2d 
990 (1980). The State Insurance Fund contends that the Leg-
islature did not intend to change the liability of the Second 
Injury Fund for temporary benefits whereas the plain language 
used as well as the presumption which applies strongly suggest 
the contrary. 
Another common rule of construction is that courts 
should construe a statute so that it's effect is sensible and in 
keeping with the purpose of the statute. Young v. Barney, 20 
Ctah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967), Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah 
2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965). In a real sense, the need for 
medical treatment and the initial period of disability 
from work arise because a worker is injured and not because 
he had a pre-existing condition which until the accident had 
not prevented him from working. It is consistent with 
the purpose of Section 69 and the Worker's Compensation Act 
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as a whole to make these immediate post-injury expenses the 
exclusive responsibility of the employer and his carrier and 
to limit the liability of the Second Injury Fund to permanent 
disability benefits attributable to pre-existing conditions 
and to medical expenses and total disability benefits which arise 
after the effects of the accident itself have resolved. 
When application of the rules of construction does not 
completely resolve a dispute about the meaning of a statute, 
courts are entitled to examine the legislative history of the 
enactment in question. Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 
497 P.2d 848 (1972); State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467 (Utah 1974) 
reh.den 535 P.2d 82. More specifically, this Court may take 
judicial notice of legislative proceedings, including discussions 
and debates about the meaning of proposed legislation by members 
of the Legislature prior to its enactment, whether reflected 
in a legislative journal or by an official transcript. State 
ex rel. Blankenship v. Freeman, 440 P.2d 744 (Okl. 1968); 
Industrial Commission v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 410 P.2d 181 
(1966); Knight v. Employment Security Agency, 88 Idaho 262, 
398 P.2d 643 (1965). 
Included as Appendix B to this brief is a copy of an 
official transcript of the proceedings in the Utah State Senate 
of March 5, 1981 relating to S.B. 187 which contained the 1981 
amendments to Utah Code Anno. §35-1-69. Senator K.S. Cornaby, 
Majority Leader and sponsor of the bill, introduced it to the 
Senate with an explanation that he was a member of the Industrial 
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Commission Advisory Board which had drafted the legislation. 
With reference to its purpose he said, 
The Bill before you, Senate Bill 187 
is a bill which comes out of that ' 
Advisory Committee to take care of 
three or four items. One is a number 
of housekeeping items, two is to 
address a couple of issues which have 
arisen concerning the Second Injury 
Fund, and to more equitably allocate 
the compensation for workmen's 
injuries between the Fund and the 
insurance companies. 
(emphasis supplied) 
Transcript of Senate proceedings, page 2, (Appendix B). Following 
this explanation, the bill was adopted without amendment or 
negative vote. 
Senator Cornaby's remarks remove any doubt about the 
purpose of the amended provision. The Legislature intended 
to change the relative liability of the Second Injury Fund and 
workmen's compensation carriers and to accomplish a "more 
equitable allocation of compensation" between them. The more 
equitable allocation was accomplished by the elimination of 
the Second Injury Fund's liability for temporary benefits. 
The Ortega case, supra, and its progeny resulted in 
a huge increase in claims filed against the Second Injury Fund 
and particularly in payments made to carriers for temporary 
total disability compensation and medical expenses. In the 
Capitano case, supra, 610 P.2d at 337, this Court noted the 
µrevailing view of members of the Industrial Commission and their 
iepresentatives that the effect of the Ortega decision was unfair to 
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the Second Injury Fund and advised those pcrsoi1s to address 
their concerns to the legislature "whose function and peroga-
tive it is to make changes or clarifications with law". The 
State Insurance Fund may dispute the wisdom of the Legislature's 
decision to adjust the balance between the Second Injury Fund 
and the workmen's compensation insurance carriers, but there 
can be no serious doubt that it intended to do so. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the Industrial 
Commission, as the agency which is charged by law with the 
administration of the Worker's Compensation Act, is entitled 
to have its administrative construction of a statutory provision 
given weight by this Court. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 
30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973). 
The Second Injury Fund respectfully submits that the 
Industrial Commission correctly construed and applied the law 
to the facts of this case. Its construction of a recent amend-
ment to Utah Code Anno. §35-1-69 is consistent with its plain 
meaning, the purpose of the Act, and the legislative history 
of the amendment. The Industrial Commission's decision on 
inistrator, 
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APPENDIX A 
35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent 
incapacity - Payment out of second injury fund - Training of 
employee. (1) If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or 
congenital causes, sustaines an industrial injury for which 
either compensation ene or medical care, or both, is pro-
vided by this title that results in permanent incapacity 
which is substantially greater than he would have incurred 
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which 
aggravates or is aggravated !2..z such pre-existing-incapacity, 
compensation ene, medical care, wfiiefi-meeieai-eere and other 
related items ere as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be 
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the 
liability of the employer for such compensation ene medical 
care, and other related items shall be for the industrial 
injury""Only and the remainder shall be paid out of the 
second injury fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1) 
referree es nsreeiei-fMnen. 
For purposes of this section, (a) aggravation of 
pre-existing injury, disease or congenital cause shall be 
deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical 
care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis 
of theCombinea injuries as prOVIded above, ---
however, that l£l where there is no such aggravation, no 
award for combined injuries shall be made unless the percentage 
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury is lQ! or greater and the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, 
including the industrial injury, is greater than 
Where the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection <ll 
J!2l of this section previously has been compensated for, 
in whole or in part, as permanent partial disability under 
this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
such compensation shall be deducted from the liability 
assessed to the second injury fund under this paragraph. 
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, 
medical expenses, or other related items are reguired as 
result of the industrial injury subject to this section, 
the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible 
for all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other 
related items E..12 to the end of the period of temporary 
total disability resulting from the industrial injury. 
allocation of disability benefits, medical or 
other related items following such period shall be made 
.tM employer QL ill insurer and the second injury fund 
as provided for herein, and fil:lY payments made Qv: the employer 
or its insurance carrier in ii§_ proportionate 
share shall be recoverable at the time of the award for 
cc;n;bined disabilities if made 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical 
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, shall review all medical 
aspects of the case and determine first, the total permanent 
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions 
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of 
permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical 
impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or 
conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease or 
congenital causes. The industrial commission shall then 
assess the liability for permanent partial disability 
compensation and future medical care to the employer on 
the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury only and refflai"eer 
amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be pay-
able out of the saie second injury fund; provided, 
however, that medical expenses shall be paid in the first 
instance .J2y the employer of its insurance carrier. Amounts, 
if any, which have been paid by the employer in excess 
of the portion attributable to the said industrial injury 
shall be reimbursed to the employer out of saie 
the second injury fund upon written request and verification 
of amounts so expended. 
(2) In addition the commission in its discretion may 
increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid out of 
such special fund, such increase to be used for the 
rehabilitation and training of any employee coming within 
the provisions of this chapter as may be certified to 
the commission by the rehabilitation department of the 
state board of education as being eligible for rehabilitation 
and training; provided, however, that in no 
there be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation 
an amount in excess of $1,000. 
APPENDIX B 
S.B. No. 187, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION MODIFICATIONS 
Sponsors: K.S. Cornaby, Fred Finlinson and Arthur Kimball 
1981 GENERAL SESSION, FORTY-FOURTH LEGISLATURE 
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 
We hereby certify that the following transcript is a verbatim 
and accurate reflection of the discussion regarding S.B. No. 187, 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION MODIFICATIONS, occurring in the Senate 
Chamber, March 5, 1981 (Day 53), and as recorded on Senate Recording 
Disc. No. 247. 
Sophia C. Buckmiller 
Secretary of the Senate 
Joan B. Thomas 
Minute Clerk, Utah State Senate 
l 
2 
3 
4 SPONSORED BY: 
5 
DATE OF DEBATE: 
6 
TRANSCRIPT OF SE!IATE FLOOR DEBATE ON 
SENATE BILL (SB 187) 
Senator K. S. Senator Fred Finlinson, and 
Senator Arthur Kimball. 
Karch 5, 1981. 
7 SECRETARY OF SENATE: Bill number 187, Worlanen's Compensation 
8 modifications by Senator the report Kr. President. Business, 
9 Labor and Economic Development to which was referred Senate Bill 187, 
10 Worlanen's Compensation modifications by Senator and others has 
11 carefully considered this bill, reports it out of Convnittee with a 
12 favorable reconvnendation. 
13 Respectfully, 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Christensen 
Convnittee Chairman 
SENATOR CHRISTENSEN: Kr. President, I move we adopt the 
Convnittee report. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Motion to adopt the Convnittee report. 
Discussion, all in favor of the motion say "aye". 
CHAMBER: Aye. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Opposed "no". 
CHAMBER: lllo. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Motion carries. Senator 
1 DOCKET CLERK: About thirty-five. Thirty-five. 
2 SENATOR CORNABY: The bill before us Kr. President, ... I have 
3 the privilege of serving as an exofficio member of the Advisory Council 
4 for the Industrial Commission, and part of the work of that Advisory 
5 Council which is comprised of both labor and management representatives 
6 is to determine needed changes and modifications in the Workmen's 
7 Compensation Act. The Bill before you, Senate Bill 187 is a bill which 
8 comes out of that Advisory Committee to take care of three or four 
9 items. One is a number of housekeeping items, two is to address a couple 
10 of issues which have arisen concerning the Second Injury Fund, and to 
11 more equitably allocate the compensation for workmen's injuries between 
12 the Fund and the insurance companies. It's a fairly technical item, but 
13 I think it is fairly straight forward. If there are any questions, I 
14 would be glad to try to respond to them, if not I'd call for the 
15 question. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Matheson. 
SENATOR MATHESON: Excuse me, does this change in the bill in 
any way change the payment structure to individuals? 
SENATOR CORNABY: Would you repeat that question? 
SENATOR MATHESON: Does the provision of this bill change the 
payment structure to individuals under the compensation in any way? 
SENATOR CORNABY: No. It does not. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Are there other questions Senator Cornaby? 
SENATOR BLACK: Only this, Kr. President, was there any 
amendments made in your Committee? 
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1 
2 
SENATOR CORNABY: No amendments made in the Standing Commit'< 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator Wayment, 
3 SENATOR SHERMAN WAYMENT: Senator Cornaby could you just gi, 
4 a little more rational of why you think it's important that just tho<. 
5 injured who now have light duties or could come back to work under i:, 
6 duty conditions now or if work is not available to them that they '" 
7 given full benefits for up to eight years? 
8 SENATOR CORNABY: It is not an eight year period, Senator 
9 Wayment, what it is is that if a person cannot find work again at his 
10 place of employment or elsewhere and is still under the doctor's care, 
ll compensation continues until the doctor releases him, and it is not t'• 
12 not necessarily an eight year period. 
lJ SENATOR SHERMAN WAYMENT: But that person is partially recovr 
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but is not fully recovered. Is that ..... 
SENATOR CORNABY: That's correct. And that applies only ifl• 
cannot find work in his field. Call for the question Hr. President. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Senator Corna by, it seems to be not too mu:· 
discussion do you want to go further than just the ..... ? 
SENATOR CORNABY: Yes, if there doesn't seem to be any 
questions, I suppose in view of the shortness of time .... 
SENATOR BUNNELL: Hr. President. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Yes Senator. 
SENATOR BUNNELL: As you know because the industdal nature r' 
my area. we are always very concerned with Workmen• s Compensation \le 
feel like this bill is a very appropdate bill and I want to support' 
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bill in every respect. It is a good piece of legislation and we need it 
2 on the books. 
3 
SENATOR CORNABY: Kr. President under suspension of the rules, I 
4 would move that we consider the bill as having been read for the second 
5 and third time and up for final passage. 
6 PRESIDENT FERRY: The motion by Senator Cornaby that we suspend 
rules and consider Senate Bill 187 as being read for the second and third 
8 time and up for final passage. Discussion on that motion, all in favor 
9 of the motion say "aye". 
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CHAMBER: Aye. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Opposed "no". 
CHAMBER: No. 
PRESIDENT FERRY: Motion carried. Now we will have a roll call 
14 vote on Senate Bill number 187, under suspension of the rules third 
15 reading calendar, the question is shall the bill pass. Roll call vote. 
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DOCKET CLERK: Asay. 
DOCKET CLERK: Asay. 
DOCKET CLERK: Bangerter. 
SENATOR BANGERTER: Aye. 
DOCKET CLERK: Barlow. 
SENATOR BARLOW: Aye. 
DOCKET CLERK: Barton. 
SENATOR BARTON: Aye. 
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1 DOCKET CLERK: Bennett. 
2 
3 DOCKET CLERK: Black. 
4 SENATOR BLACK: Aye. 
5 DOCKET CLERK: Bullen. 
6 
7 DOCKET CLERK: Bunnell. 
8 SENATOR BUNNELL: Aye. 
9 DOCKET CLERK: Carling. 
10 SENATOR CARLING: Aye. 
11 DOCKET CLERK: Christensen. 
12 SENATOR CHRISTENSEN: Aye. 
13 DOCKET CLERK: Cornaby. 
14 SENATOR CORNABY: Aye. 
15 DOCKET CLERK: Farley. 
16 SENATOR FARLEY: Aye. 
17 DOCKET CLERK: Finlinson. 
18 SENATOR FINLINSON: Aye. 
19 DOCKET CLERK: Flarmn. 
20 
21 DOCKET CLERK: Halverson. 
22 SENATOR HALVERSON: Aye. 
23 DOCKET CLERK: Jeffs. 
24 SENATOR JEFFS: Aye. 
25 DOCKET CLERK: Jones. 
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SENATOR JONES: Pass. 
2 DOCKET CLERK: Kimball. 
3 
4 DOCKET CLERK: Matheson. 
5 SENATOR MATHESON: Aye. 
6 DOCKET CLERK: Honey. 
SENATOR HONEY: Aye. 
8 DOCKET CLERK: Cary Peterson. 
9 SENATOR PETERSON: Aye. 
10 DOCKET CLERK: Lowell Peterson. 
11 SENATOR PETERSON: Aye. 
12 DOCKET CLERK: Pugh. 
13 SENATOR PUGH: Aye. 
14 DOCKET CLERK: Sandberg. 
15 
16 DOCKET CLERK: Snow. 
17 SENATOR SNOW: Aye. 
18 DOCKET CLERK: Sowards. 
19 
20 DOCKET CLERK: swan. 
21 SENATOR SWAN: Aye. 
22 DOCKET CLERK: Wayment. 
23 SENATOR WAYMENT: Aye. 
24 DOCKET CLERK: Hr. President. 
25 PRESIDENT FERRY: Aye. 
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1 DOCKET CLERK: Jones. 
2 SENATOR JONES: Aye. 
3 PRESIDENT FERRY: Senate 187 under suspension rules final 
4 passage with total 21 ayes, 1 nay and 7 being absent receives the 
5 constitutional majority, bill passes and referred to the House for 
6 further action. 
7 Senate Bill 209. 
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